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NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
LOCHNERISM FOR A NEW ECONOMY 
JEDEDIAH PURDY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Neoliberalism has a constitutional face. It figures in judicial and popular 
interpretations of free speech, due process, equal protection, and federalism, as 
surely as it does in intellectual property, family law, health policy, and the other 
areas that our contributors address.1 In this article, I make the case that there is 
something special about the constitutional expression of neoliberalism, which 
arises from three features of constitutional law: its basicness, its breadth, and its 
integrating tendency. 
Constitutional neoliberalism is basic because it weaves neoliberal ideas into 
some of the country’s most fundamental legal principles. Constitutional 
doctrines of rights and structure both set out the elemental boundaries of 
governance—what governments may and may not do—and tie these rudiments 
of public power and constraint to orienting moral ideas: what interests and 
capacities most matter in people, which collective purposes define the role of 
government, and which constraints on government are essential to respecting 
individuals. Constitutional neoliberalism is broad in that it touches many areas 
of legal regulation, from state controls on pharmaceutical marketing to the 
federal individual-insurance mandate to corporate campaign contributions. It is 
integrating because the burden of principled constitutional decisionmaking is to 
identify common stakes across these areas. Giving an account of liberty and 
equality that integrates a variety of areas of regulation tends to produce, 
however roughly and inconsistently, a moral image of the person as a 
constitutional citizen. An account of federalism tends to produce such an image 
of the levels and roles of government. And where a variety of constitutional 
doctrines set limits on the regulation of economic life, they tend to produce a 
moral image of the economy. 
In particular, I argue that there is value in illuminating emerging 
constitutional neoliberalism by comparison with the much-debated Lochner 
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Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 131; Frank 
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era, the period when U.S. jurisprudence came closest to constitutionalizing 
classical liberalism in economic matters. The comparison focuses attention on a 
series of key issues, despite the obvious dangers of tendentious parallel-drawing 
and hasty generalization that inhere in aligning distinct eras. These dangers are 
worth specifying upfront, as they are sure to occur to thoughtful readers. One 
danger has to do with the characterization of “constitutional eras,” in the past 
or in one’s own time, which of course can obscure more than it reveals about 
the messiness, diversity, and contestation within any moment of constitutional 
law and politics, and about the continuity across “eras” of constitutional themes 
and concerns. In other words, talk of eras can make the Constitution seem both 
falsely whole at any moment and falsely fragmented across time. 
The second danger lies in comparison, in which two interpretations, each 
necessarily simplified, are set alongside each other for mutual illumination; 
plainly, the effect could be to amplify distortion instead. That being said, 
however, it is also true that in constitutional law, the whole is sometimes more 
than the sum of its parts, and commentators need ways to acknowledge and 
work with this fact. Constitutional law has epochs: between the mid 1950s and 
the late 1960s, the Supreme Court of Chief Justice Earl Warren went to war 
against Southern segregation, implemented a strong new voting-rights 
jurisprudence, and revolutionized criminal law with a series of protections for 
the accused. The individual cases of that time are part of a larger picture of the 
Court’s role: to help create a certain kind of decent society by enforcing an 
image of the legal and political meaning of equal citizenship in a democratic 
polity. American society gathers this set of facts within the term “Warren 
Court,” which critics and celebrators alike understand despite the many 
necessary qualifications. 
II 
WHY CALL IT A NEW LOCHNERISM? WHAT THE COMPARISON SHOWS ABOUT 
NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The “Lochner era,” of course, refers to the Supreme Court’s desultory affair 
with economic libertarianism, beginning in the late nineteenth century and 
abruptly ending on or about March 29, 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish.2 In the namesake 1905 case, Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state law setting maximum daily and weekly hours for bakers.3 
The Court ruled that the law violated constitutionally protected “liberty of 
contract,” the freedom of both employees and employers to make whatever 
agreements they saw fit.4 Minimum-wage laws were another prime target of 
Lochner reasoning because they forbade the contractual choice to accept low 
 
 2.  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 3.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 4.  Id. at 64. 
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pay.5 The Court also invalidated laws that voided anti-union contracts to 
advance organized labor,6 struck down price regulations,7 and, more 
sympathetically, overturned barriers to entry in some trades8 and invalidated a 
residential segregation law as a violation of the white seller’s right to transfer 
his property as he liked.9 Between the 1880s and the 1930s, the Supreme Court 
struck down more than 200 pieces of state and federal legislation as violations 
of “economic liberty” and laissez-faire policy. 
More specifically, the Lochner era provides a hindsight view—with the 
partly artificial neatness of a completed episode—of what constitutional 
jurisprudence can look like when it adopts a moralized view of economic life 
that protects individual autonomy in market transactions. 
First, key cases in the era take certain economic transactions as paradigms 
of constitutional liberty and equality. Lochner itself embraces a picture of 
liberty that centers on the contractual transactions of the autonomous 
producer—the worker bargaining with a potential employer over the terms of 
the labor contract. The same is true of cases dealing with wages, anti-union 
contract terms, and other products of labor-market bargaining. The 
paradigmatic constitutional citizen of these cases exercises the economic 
autonomy of a buyer or seller of labor, of more traditional and literal real-estate 
property or of the services of the craftsman or small businessman.10 This is the 
substance of activity protected under both the liberty and equality clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; as courts sometimes explain, equal freedom to 
participate in these transactions places a person, at least potentially, within a 
Horatio Alger–style life-course of acquisition and ownership.11 
There is a parallel in today’s neoliberal constitutionalism, which 
concentrates on forms of autonomy that are more characteristic of twenty-first 
century capitalism than that of a century ago: selling data, making consumption 
decisions, and deciding how to spend money more generally to advance one’s 
preferences.12 Even as the older model of economic constitutional liberty 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 6.  E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
 7.  E.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). 
 8.  E.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 9.  Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 10.  See id.; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating a state law 
prohibiting any person from manufacturing ice without first obtaining a certificate of convenience and 
necessity); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 11.  See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Wis. State Agric. Soc’y (Sept. 30, 1859) (arguing 
that mobility and the openness of careers and property ownership made American economy uniquely 
free and equal). 
 12.  For examples, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–91 (2012) (the 
Sebelius reasoning on the Commerce Clause); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011); the 
campaign-finance cases: Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and 
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010); and the commercial-speech 
cases: Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
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remains largely exiled, as it has been since its rejection during the New Deal, a 
new set of activities has formed a new version of economic constitutional 
liberty, much of it anchored in the First Amendment.13 
III 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Today the principle that Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech”14 is perhaps the most familiar phrase in the Constitution, 
and certainly one of the most iconic for liberals. Recently, though, it has 
become a linchpin in the Supreme Court’s antiregulatory cases. Constitutional 
protection of speech increasingly means protection of spending, advertising, and 
even markets for the data that advertisers use to craft their messages. The Court 
has overturned regulation in each of these areas in the name of free speech. 
Lurking behind these doctrinal changes is an image of the world in which 
politics and argument are practically the same as pursuing one’s preferences 
through spending and seeking profit by advertising. This image assimilates to a 
single constitutional status two kinds of activity that have traditionally received 
very different levels of protection: classic political speech on the one hand and 
market activities such as spending, marketing, and data-mining on the other. 
The result has been to accord spending, marketing, and data-mining a level of 
constitutional protection very near to that traditionally given to speech. 
In the instantly infamous 2010 Citizens United decision, Justice Kennedy 
applied these principles in full-throated fashion to strike down a ban on certain 
corporate spending in elections.15 Justice Kennedy’s opinion embraced a pair of 
principles that epitomize the First Amendment’s neoliberal version. First, limits 
on spending count as limits on speech,16 so the power to write a million-dollar 
check for a wave of last-minute advertising has about the same constitutional 
status as the right to post a blog entry making the case for your candidate. This 
spending-equals-speech equation was not new, only amplified: It dated back to 
a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo, which overturned limits on individual spending as 
unconstitutional speech restrictions.17 
Rather, the novelty of Citizens United lay in its announcement that 
corporations’ political speech (read: spending) enjoys the same constitutional 
protection as individuals’ speech.18 Taken together, the money-is-speech 
 
U.S. 447 (1978).  
     13. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Consumer Sovereignty Trumps Popular Sovereignty: The Economic 
Explanation for Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, 46 IND. L. REV. 603, 631–32 (2013).  
 14.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 15.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 16.  Id. at 347–48, 354–55. 
 17.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Timothy K. Kuhner, The Democracy to Which We 
Are Entitled: Human Rights and the Problem of Money in Politics, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 73 (2013) 
(explaining that in Buckley the Court also held that equality was, and thus still is, an unconstitutional 
goal). 
 18.  See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–43. 
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principle and the extension of First Amendment protection to corporations 
meant that for Congress to limit corporate campaign spending was just as 
unconstitutional as banning a flesh-and-blood person from arguing for or 
against health care reform. Justice Kennedy’s language was dire: “The 
censorship we now confront is vast in its reach.”19 He warned, quoting an earlier 
opinion by Justice Scalia, that “the Government has muffled the voices that best 
represent the most significant segments of the economy.”20 The decision’s effect 
on campaigns was immediate and dramatic: The advocacy group Public Citizen 
reports that in the 2012 presidential election cycle, spending by newly 
constitutionally empowered outside groups rose by 243 percent over the 2008 
cycle.21 
Just a year later, Justice Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion in Sorrell v. 
IMS Health, the Vermont pharmaceutical decision.22 The backdrop of the case 
was the enormous amount that drug companies spend marketing their products 
to doctors and consumers—estimated at more than thirty billion dollars 
annually in a 2008 study, which put marketing ahead of research and 
development as a share of industry spending.23 Pharmacies and data-miners 
serve drug marketers by selling them doctors’ prescription records, which the 
marketers use to target their sales efforts.24 Vermont had barred the sale (or 
giveaway) of prescription information and its use in marketing except where 
physicians gave permission for their records to be used.25 The policy was meant 
to protect doctors’ and patients’ privacy, and also to offset some of the market 
power of the big drug companies, in the hope that more doctors would 
prescribe less-expensive generic medicines.26 
Justice Kennedy wrote that the law was unconstitutional because it 
burdened speech—marketing—based on the identity of the speaker (patent-
holding drug companies) and the content of the message (“prescribe our 
drugs”).27 Kennedy described the issue as follows: “The State may not burden 
the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction. ‘The 
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, 
provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.’”28 There is something 
 
 19.  Id. at 354. 
 20.  Id.; see also Kuhner, supra note 13, at 4 (explaining that a year after Citizens United the Court 
continued on this trajectory in its decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, which has allowed money in politics to reach “sufficiently towering heights”). 
 21.  PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC 210 (2013), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/students-citizens-united-guide-factsheet.pdf. 
 22.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 23.  See York University, Big Pharma Spends More on Advertising than Research and 
Development, Study Finds, SCIENCE DAILY (Jan. 7, 2008), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm. 
 24.  Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 2661. 
 27.  Id. at 2663. 
 28.  Id. at 2671 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)). 
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otherworldly about describing as “public debate” companies’ targeted pitches 
to physicians. This constitutional peculiarity has two sources: one very much in 
line with Citizens United, the other even stranger and more innovative. 
The peculiarity that is in line with Citizens United is the Court’s growing 
protection for businesses’ commercial speech.29 For more than three decades, 
the Supreme Court has moved toward treating advertising as strongly protected 
constitutional speech. Although the Court wrote in 1942 that “purely 
commercial advertising” does not enjoy the First Amendment’s shield,30 in 1976 
(the year of Buckley v. Valeo) the Justices reversed that doctrine in Virginia 
State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia State Consumer Council. The Court struck 
down a Virginia law that forbade pharmacists to advertise drug prices, which 
was supposed to protect professionalism and discourage race-to-the-bottom 
competition.31 The decision established that purely economic speech, such as 
announcing low prices to potential customers, enjoys the protection of the First 
Amendment.32 The Court reasoned that advertising conveys useful information 
to consumers, which makes their decisions more efficient, and observed that a 
listener’s interest in the price of medicine might be “as keen, if not keener by 
far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”33 
There is something reasonable in this formulation: The plaintiffs were 
consumers, not marketers, and the Court observed that, with advertising 
forbidden, drug prices varied widely around the state.34 At the same time, 
however, this passage hints at very basic developments taking constitutional law 
in a neoliberal direction. First, the passage imagines the subject of constitutional 
rights not as a citizen engaged in political debate, but as a consumer worried 
about prices. Of course people care about whether they can get medicine; but 
the meaning of the doctrinal development is not that access to medicine is a 
constitutional interest: it is that the consumer tracking prices, as much as the 
citizen following debates, is exercising the liberty that the Constitution 
enshrines. 
Second, the doctrine addresses the human interest in getting essential 
resources—medicine—or, more generically, fulfilling consumer preferences, 
through a specific act of constitutional imagination: It treats the market as the 
assumed vehicle for satisfying this interest. The First Amendment interest in 
economic communication has an implied institutional context, the market, 
which gives the First Amendment the function of making markets more closely 
approximate the neoclassical ideal of perfect information. This development is 
 
29. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of 
Economic Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395, 398–401 (2011) (attributing this movement to 
changes in Court membership which “have redefined democracy on the basis of this free market 
approach to constitutional values”). 
 30.  Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
 31.  Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. State Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 32.  Id. at 776. 
 33.  Id. at 763. 
 34.  Id. at 753–54. 
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currently naturalizing the market through constitutional interpretation, as 
surely as liberty-of-contract doctrine did during the Lochner era, but with a 
focus on the consumer economy rather than the industrial labor market.35 
In Virginia State Pharmacy Board, only Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing 
that, although the Court’s preferred policy might be sensible, there is no 
constitutional interest in shielding advertising from regulation.36 In the decades 
since, although the Court has tenuously maintained the formula that 
commercial speech receives lesser protection than “core” political speech, it has 
struck down limits on advertising for legal services, liquor stores, and tobacco 
products.37 A certain amount of the everything-for-sale quality of American 
public spaces owes directly to the Court’s protection of commercial speech. The 
Justices have never said, though, that advertising deserves the same very strict 
protection as political debate. Sorrell, the Vermont case, came as close as any to 
dissolving any distinction between advertising and argument. 
The stranger and more innovative aspect of Sorrell is that the case extended 
First Amendment protection beyond anything recognizable as speech. Most of 
what the decision protects is not verbal expression or even political spending 
but simply the sale of data. Sorrell moved toward constitutionalizing an open 
market in information, at least where the data informs marketing decisions and 
where the regulation has different effects on different market actors. Just as the 
right to speak first implied the right to spend and the right to argue implied a 
right to advertise, now the rights to spend and advertise imply a right to buy and 
sell the information that goes into marketing (which is itself robustly protected 
as speech), so there is now a constitutionally protected interest in exchanging 
information on the same terms as everyone else in the market. Any limit on 
information markets, Kennedy reasoned in Sorrell, tilts the playing field in 
favor of those who have more access to data—in Vermont’s case, generic drug 
companies and public-health agencies.38 
As Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, regulators control the form and 
content of information transfer all the time, for instance, in guidelines for public 
and shareholders’ communications by energy and financial companies, 
restrictions on the uses pharmaceutical companies may recommend for their 
drugs, and various controls on disclosure of patient information by doctors and 
hospitals.39 Many of these regulations are specific to the content of the speech 
and identity of the speaker, which was the constitutional problem with the 
Vermont law.40 It would be simplistic to say that those regulations are on the 
 
 35.  I thank David Grewal for helping me to appreciate this point. 
 36.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781. 
 37.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down a law that forbade 
advertising tobacco near schools); Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (ban on 
advertising liquor prices violates First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) 
(law forbidding attorney advertising violates First Amendment). 
 38.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011). 
 39.  Id. at 2676.  
 40.  Id. at 2677. 
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chopping block, but the reasoning of Sorrell puts their constitutionality in 
doubt. If nothing else, that reasoning creates a powerful and flexible tool for 
limiting regulation of information markets and further amplifies the Court’s 
solicitude for marketing as a core constitutional concern. For instance, post-
2008 financial regulations requiring disclosure of standard-form information for 
certain financial products and services, or limiting the kinds of claims hedge 
funds or mortgage providers can make to clients, could be subject to 
constitutional challenge. 
These changes in the First Amendment’s meaning put new intellectual 
premises to work in constitutional law, premises not themselves implied by the 
Constitution. For one, this neo-Lochnerism supposes that the distinction 
between politics and markets, or principles and interests, is spurious: A 
democratically adopted policy is just the aggregation of some people’s interests, 
and a company’s economic interests make as worthy a basis for political 
argument as any principle. For another, there is no publicly acceptable measure 
of value except what people say they want and are willing to pay for: 
preferences, that is, backed by cash. Any attempt to establish an independent 
standard, such as fairness or cultural excellence, is elitist, parochial, or a try at 
petty tyranny. For a third, markets are the best way by far of capturing and 
maximizing this uniquely valid type of value. Therefore, elections and other 
institutions should come to resemble markets as much as possible. The one 
incontrovertibly valuable kind of freedom, then, is the freedom that makes 
markets work. It is in this neoliberal, market-fixated climate that courts can 
declare that spending is speech, advertisement is argument, and the transfer of 
marketing data is a core concern of the First Amendment. 
These ideas are to the present what classical laissez-faire and social 
Darwinism were to the age of Lochner. As the rise of industrial capitalism and a 
vast population of wage laborers made freedom of contract pervasively relevant 
at the turn of the last century, today an economy built on consumption and 
information makes the First Amendment a natural vehicle to constitutionalize 
transactions at the core of the market. Much of what happens in the American 
economy is some hybrid of marketing and information transfer. Products, 
images, information, ideas, and advertising are increasingly aspects of a single 
economic process. There was nothing comparable in 1905 to the perennial 
marketing campaigns that make up a quarter of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
spending, or the First Amendment–protected video game industry, the most 
violent and interactive of a new kind of entertainment product that the First 
Amendment secures from regulation. 
For all these reasons, the First Amendment has helped the Supreme Court 
to do for the consumer capitalism of the information age what freedom of 
contract did for the industrial age: constitutionally protect certain transactions 
that lie at the core of the economy. This makes unequal economic power much 
harder for democratic lawmaking to reach, because there are only a few ways to 
reduce the effect of economic inequality: redistribute wealth, guarantee certain 
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goods (such as education or health care) regardless of wealth, and limit what 
the wealthy can do with their money. Constitutional protection of marketing 
and spending takes the last option off the table at a time when the other two are 
politically embattled. Whether in elections or in marketing and the vast data 
economy behind it, the market itself, with all its inequality, is ever more 
thoroughly constitutionalized as a realm of freedom. 
This development is a milestone in the Court’s march away from a principle 
that it accepted with the New Deal: Buying and selling enjoy no special 
constitutional status, and legislatures can regulate markets and businesses to 
make life more equitable, safe, or healthful. Now, when these policy decisions 
are interpreted as implicating the First Amendment, the wealthy interests 
burdened by social and economic legislation can appeal from the political 
process to the Supreme Court, delaying regulation and raising its costs, and 
sometimes they win, sending lawmakers back to the start of an often-fractious 
process.41 Moreover, these cases give wealthy interests a rhetorical leg up: they 
can denounce regulation as “censorship” with the Supreme Court and the 
neoliberal Constitution behind them.42 
IV 
RIGHTS AND STRUCTURE 
The second contribution of the Lochner-era comparison is to cast light on 
the connection between the jurisprudence of constitutional rights and that of 
constitutional structure, particularly federalism. Although these are, formally 
speaking, distinct principles, it is not accidental that the same Lochner-era 
courts that invalidated state economic regulations on equal-protection and due-
process grounds also overturned federal economic regulations as exceeding the 
Constitution’s grant of power in the Commerce Clause.43 Nor is the link as bare 
and inarticulate as the fact that both kinds of rulings had the concrete effect of 
enabling employers to pay lower wages, hire child workers, and so forth.44 
Rather, the areas of social life exempted from federal regulation were 
associated with specific values, the same that were protected by Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence. So Justice Day wrote in 1918 that if Congress can 
 
 41.  See Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First 
Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-
corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation (giving examples of recent First Amendment 
challenges to securities laws, anti-corruption laws, and food-labeling regulations).   
42. See also Kuhner, supra note 29, at 409 (“The Court’s theoretical view is tenable, however, and, 
upon reflection, clear: speech occurs within a marketplace and that marketplace must remain as free as 
possible, limited only by the need to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”). 
 43.  See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 44.  See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 43 U.S. 394 (1923) (holding federal minimum wage for 
women and children violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), overruled by West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (holding federal child labor laws 
as outside Congress’s Commerce Clause power). 
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forbid interstate shipment of goods produced in factories where children under 
fourteen were employed or children under sixteen worked more than eight 
hours a day, “all freedom of commerce will be at an end.”45 The idealization of a 
certain version of laissez-faire economic relations as “freedom of commerce” 
lent charisma and cogency to both lines of cases. 
The parallel today is evident in the arguments against the 2010 Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA’s) individual insurance–purchase mandate that persuaded 
five Justices that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.46 Formally speaking, the judgment made in Sebelius was purely 
structural, based in the extent of the Article I, Section 8 grant of legislative 
power to Congress.47 However, near the heart of the Justices’ opinions rejecting 
the commerce power basis for the individual mandate is the idea that the 
Constitution protects, even indirectly, the autonomy of the consumer deciding 
how to spend her money.48 The moral and political gravamen of the structural 
argument, that is, captured the present mood of laissez-faire for consumer 
capitalism, as Justice Day’s warning about the end of “freedom of commerce” 
did a century ago for the industrial economy.49 
The strangeness of the ACA ruling lies precisely in its use of a structural 
federalism argument to protect a substantive individual right. In legislating, 
Congress always faces two kinds of constitutional constraints: Some 
Congressional actions are forbidden by rights-protecting language such as the 
First Amendment while others, though not prohibited, lack authorization in the 
Constitution’s enumeration of Congress’s powers. The five Justices who found 
that the Commerce Clause cannot support the individual mandate relied, of 
course, on the latter kind of constraint. 
The Court has given a famously broad interpretation of the power “to 
regulate commerce . . . among the several states”50 since the New Deal cases 
overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and turned decisively away from other cases 
striking down federal economic regulation, such as Carter v. Carter Coal.51 
Upholding the federal ban on home production of medical marijuana for 
personal use in the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich is only one recent, 
touchstone instance.52 In Gonzales, the Justices reasoned that, although the 
medical marijuana in question was not intended to leave the state or enter any 
commercial flow, it might find its way into the market for illegal drugs, and so 
prohibiting it was an integral part of a broader federal scheme of regulating (by 
 
 45.  Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. 
 46.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 47.  Id. at 2578–80, 2585–93. 
 48.  See Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and the Fight 
Over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177 (making this argument with extensive supporting detail and 
interpretation). 
 49.  See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. 
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 51.  See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 52.  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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prohibition) interstate traffic in marijuana.53 
But in Sebelius, five Justices held that the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to require individuals to make purchases in a field of 
economic life that they have not already voluntarily joined.54 Decide to become 
a farmer, the argument goes, and one may be subject to all kinds of regulations, 
quotas, and so forth.55 The initial choice to enter the field means taking on its 
regulatory burdens. But a passive citizen, just by being, has done nothing to 
subject herself to the insurance mandate.56 Once she enters the field of health 
care consumption, the Justices conceded, she can be required to buy insurance; 
but as long as, like Winnie-the-Pooh, she just is, Congress cannot reach her.57 
This argument is strange because, although it formally addresses the limits 
of federal power, its rhetorical, moral, and political force comes from its appeal 
to the autonomy of the consumer and warnings that a runaway Congress might 
violate that autonomy. Lower federal courts overturning the individual 
mandate invariably invoked dark fantasies of a paternalistic government 
requiring citizens to buy American cars, health-club memberships, or 
vegetables.58 The same dire warnings appeared in several of the Justices’ 
Sebelius opinions. The odd thing about this parade of nanny-state horribles is 
that, because the Commerce Clause concerns the powers of Congress, not the 
rights of individuals, a ruling that invalidates the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause simply means that only state governments, not the federal 
government, can pass such a law. Massachusetts had done just that in a piece of 
legislation that served as a template for the ACA.59 
Under modern doctrine, there is no such thing as an important, 
constitutionally protected personal liberty that a state can violate but the 
federal government cannot, or vice-versa. The Constitution protects individual 
rights against all government action, regardless of the source (with a handful of 
minor exceptions that are not relevant here). By and large, any personal right 
protected under the Bill of Rights is applied against the states via incorporation 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the limitations 
that the Equal Protection Clause imposes on the states are enforced against the 
federal government by judicial interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause as including an equal-protection component.60 The Commerce 
Clause governs federal but not state power because it is not a rights-protecting 
 
 53.  Id. at 17–22. 
 54.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–87 (2012). 
 55.  Id. at 2587–88. 
 56.  Id. at 2590. 
 57.  See BENJAMIN HOFF, THE TAO OF POOH (1982) (using A.A. Milne characters to illustrate a 
version of Taoist thought and practice). The quote comes from the famous summary on the back cover: 
“While Eeyore frets and Piglet hesitates and Rabbit calculates and Owl pontificates, Pooh just is.” 
 58.  See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1289 (2011). 
 59.  2006 Mass. Acts 77–158. 
 60.  Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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clause; yet Sebelius and lower-court rulings proceeded as if they were 
vindicating a constitutional right of consumer liberty. 
The irony is particularly acute because the modern constitutional era is 
marked by rejection, since 1937, of the idea that the Constitution secures 
personal rights of negative economic liberty.61 Justice Day in Hammer v. 
Dagenhart at least referred to a then-recognized constitutional liberty when he 
moved to protect “freedom of commerce” through the Commerce Clause.62 
Although structural doctrines and rights-protecting doctrines are formally 
distinct, the very fact that it seems anomalous to allow states to intrude on 
rights that the federal government may not, or vice-versa (the intuition driving 
the incorporation and reverse-incorporation doctrines merging the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments) lends some plausibility to interpretation in the style 
of Justice Day, which can seem an early effort to merge rights against federal 
and state regulation into a coherent web. Because the decisive post-1937 
rejection of the idea that the Constitution protects negative economic liberties 
remains in effect, there is no similar hope of doctrinal coherence in the 
Commerce Clause reasoning of Sebelius. 
There is, however, an ideological coherence: the commitment to an idea of 
negative economic liberty as a touchstone personal freedom, an idea embedded 
in an idealized image of a market economy, lends impetus to the thought that 
the Constitution should protect the passive consumer in her Bartleby-like 
choice to decline health insurance. We can see in hindsight that the Lochner 
era’s antiregulatory cases constitutionalized a laissez-faire picture of the 
economy precisely because they reached beyond the liberty-of-contract doctrine 
that decided Lochner itself and shaped other areas, including structural issues 
not formally concerned with direct protection of personal rights. In so doing, 
the cases of the Lochner era enforced a constitutional line that in many 
instances protected unequal bargaining power in the private economy from 
interference by government regulation. Similarly, the limit on federal power 
that the Sebelius Court announced complements the First Amendment cases’ 
protection of buying, selling, and marketing in a single, nascent conception of 
economic liberty. 
A second telling development in structural doctrine is the limitation on 
Congress’s spending power announced in Sebelius. On this issue, seven Justices 
ruled that the Affordable Care Act’s provision withdrawing existing Medicaid 
federal funding from states that declined to expand the program as the ACA 
directed amounted to unconstitutional coercion of state governments.63 In a 
reminder that the appeal of neoliberal jurisprudence64 is not restricted to the 
 
 61.  West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not speak 
of freedom of contract.”). 
 62.  See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918). 
 63.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–05, 2660–62 (2012) (plurality 
and dissenting opinions). 
64. Neoliberal jurisprudence is defined as “the use of neoclassical economic theory as judicial 
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right-hand side of a Court divided along partisan lines, Justice Roberts’s 
plurality opinion attracted the votes of Justices Breyer and Kagan. The heart of 
the plurality opinion’s reasoning was that the formally separate character of the 
earlier Medicaid statutes and the ACA, in addition to the amount of federal 
money at stake, marked the ACA’s conditional Medicaid grants as “coercion” 
rather than as an offer that the states were free to accept or refuse.65 
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the issue, joined by Justice Kennedy, Alito, and 
Thomas, reveals the concrete stakes of this rather formalistic claim. Justice 
Scalia argued that the ACA’s conditional spending, if permitted, would greatly 
raise the cost to states of opting out of federal social programs because the 
states’ residents would be required to pay the taxes that fund those programs, 
regardless of whether they were to accept the conditional grants that would 
return the same money to the states.66 State residents would also need to pay 
taxes to support any alternative approach to the same social program—a state 
version of low-income medical support that does not fit the requirements of the 
ACA, for instance.67 This double payment would sharply limit effective state 
autonomy in policymaking, bringing the ACA’s conditional spending 
intolerably close to the Congressional commandeering of state legislatures that 
the Court has elsewhere rejected on federalism grounds.68 
The functional meaning of this decision is that Congress faces a major 
constitutional barrier to its long-preferred way of imposing national settlements 
on basic questions of social policy. In this functional sense, the Medicaid-
expansion decision is aligned with pre–New Deal Commerce Clause cases, 
notably Hammer v. Dagenhart, that also found in state autonomy a limit on 
Congress’s power to shape a national economy according to a unifying set of 
ethical imperatives: there, no child labor; here, significant public subsidy of 
health care for low-income individuals and families. In the area of social 
benefits, such settlements tend, of course, to have major distributive 
consequences. 
The Court’s interpretation of the spending power as limiting Congress’s 
distributive power in the interest of state autonomy also produces another and 
arguably more peculiar alignment for Sebelius: one with Pollock v. Farmers’ 
Loan & Trust Co., the 1895 decision holding that a federal income tax violated 
a constitutional requirement that the burdens of “direct taxes” be apportioned 
according to state population.69 The requirement blocks national majorities 
from ganging up on states composed of an electoral minority to impose unequal 
tax burdens. Although the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, invalidated by 
 
reasoning.” Kuhner, supra note 29, at 397.   
 65.  Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion). 
 66.  Id. at 2661–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 2661–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion on commandeering, see New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–81 (1992). 
 69.  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
PURDY_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2014  12:55 PM 
208 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:195 
Pollock, imposed no disproportionate tax burden, that it did not formally 
allocate the tax burden according to state population gave a five-Justice 
majority a hook to rule for the plaintiffs who had argued, as Justice Harlan 
recounted in his dissent, that “this income tax was an assault by the poor upon 
the rich,” and that the Court must “stand in the breach for the protection of the 
just rights of property against the advancing hosts of socialism.”70 In both 
Sebelius and Pollock, the Court used the specter of redistribution among the 
states to limit Congress’s authority to impose a national settlement on basic 
distributive questions concerning how the benefits and burdens of economic life 
are shared. 
V 
THE LIMITS OF THE SAYABLE: WHERE IS THE WALL? 
In an effort to rehabilitate the doctrine and worldview of Lochner, a set of 
libertarian constitutional theorists have made a rhetorically convenient, if 
conceptually awkward, two-part case that (1) the doctrines of the era were more 
benign and defensible than they have been portrayed as being in the 
conventional hindsight story; and (2) in any case, those doctrines received 
inconsistent application that never hardened into a constitutional rule against 
redistribution.71 The second part of the defense, that the Lochner era never 
really generated a set of clear and consistently enforced rules, is a red herring, 
and understanding why reveals a third benefit of thinking about the present 
moment in light of the Lochner era. 
During the Lochner era, the significance of liberty-of-contract and 
antiregulatory federalism doctrines was not that they became a hard-and-fast 
set of rules, but that they created, used, and, in so doing, expanded a set of 
available constitutional arguments. As Jack Balkin has argued, the era, like 
others, was marked not so much by hard lines and fixed points of doctrine as by 
what kinds of constitutional arguments were unsayable, or “off-the-wall,” and 
what kinds were available for use and innovation.72 The arguments offered by 
litigants challenging regulation in cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart show that 
it was entirely possible to advance a consistent theory of a laissez-faire 
Constitution, based on case language and principles distilled from that 
language, and that members of the Supreme Court Bar regarded that strategy 
as their best gambit in many cases—including some that they won on variations 
of those principles.73 
To illuminate the importance of this possibility, it may be helpful to 
compare it to a pair of familiar positions in the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the early twenty-first century: the vision of the Equal Protection Clause as 
 
 70.  Id. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 71.  See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–22 (2011).  
 72.  JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 174–84 (2011). 
 73.  See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 266–68 (1918). 
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enforcing a “color-blind Constitution,” which has at least four adherents based 
on the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District,74 and the view that some combination of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process clauses supplies a right to same-sex marriage.75 Neither is the 
law of the land. Both have made their way “onto the wall,” the marriage-
equality position in the last decade, the color-blind view over several decades. 
These arguments’ becoming “sayable” has three kinds of consequences: The 
availability of these arguments imposes (1) costs in litigation, (2) caution in 
drafting, and (3) general uncertainty on those who support, design, and 
implement the policies that the novel arguments call into question. These 
arguments also hold open the possibility of further constitutional development 
in the directions they mark out: as long as these doors are not closed, future 
Courts might go through them and keep walking. The post-1937 rejection of the 
Lochner era was a Carthaginian peace: the New Deal Justices ploughed salt into 
the fields of Lochner and made its name anathema for decades.76 
Without such unconditional defeat, a whole series of advances remains 
possible with just one or two Supreme Court appointments or a single 
watershed case. In their most diffuse effect, but with great consequence, these 
doctrines enable activists and innovators both inside and outside of litigation to 
make claims on the Constitution that put their preferred positions outside 
ordinary political debate.77 They create, in other words, pathways for turning 
activism and movement commitment into constitutional law—one of the more 
potent and mysterious achievements possible in U.S. politics. 
The same is true of the new set of antiregulatory doctrines. They entangle 
classically legislative action, such as the design and passage of the Affordable 
Care Act, in prolonged constitutional litigation and create uncertainty and 
drafting anxiety around advertising restrictions, disclosure requirements, and 
regulation of the digital economy. They make possible the alchemy of political 
disagreement into disputes over constitutive national principle that is the 
hallmark of constitutional politics. For one salient example, they have enabled 
the Tea Party’s mistrust of Barack Obama’s presidency and of federal 
regulation generally to flow into constitutional form in the Commerce Clause 
 
 74.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 75.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating portions of the Defense of 
Marriage Act on equal protection grounds); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(invalidating Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage under due-process strict scrutiny); Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Utah’s ban on same sex marriage). 
 76.  See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (“What is this freedom?  The 
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”).  Thereafter, substantive due process was long an 
accusation—a self-evidently bad form of reasoning that Justices accused one another of falling into.  
See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675–76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(accusing majority of “using the old ‘natural-law-due-process formula’ to justify striking down state 
laws”). 
 77.  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (on popular constitutionalism). 
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argument against the individual mandate.78 
At first, that argument struck most serious constitutional commentators as a 
blend of perversely contrarian academic exercise and know-nothing populism.79 
What it had become by the time five Justices adopted it—a serious piece of 
constitutional argumentation—was as much a diagnostic symptom of a 
neoliberal moment as it was an achievement of anyone involved in the 
litigation. Even more markedly than ordinary women and men, constitutional 
jurists must make history under circumstances that they do not choose. Both the 
Lochner era and the present moment come into focus partly when considered in 
light of the history that they enable jurists to make. 
Part of the reason that neoliberal doctrines enjoyed relatively quick 
ascendancy is that the post-1937 repudiation of the Lochner era was never as 
complete or as deep as it seemed in the scornful hindsight of mid-century 
Supreme Court opinions. This is true in at least two respects. First, although 
certain specific doctrines were set aside in 1937, there was no successful move to 
constitutionalize the New Deal settlement. A brief move in the direction of 
constitutional guarantees of minimum social benefits and equal protection 
scrutiny of policies that ill-served the poor, such as inequitable public-school 
funding tied to property taxes, collapsed between 1970 and 1973, leaving such 
policies almost entirely to legislative discretion.80 Judicial language about the 
importance of education, food, and shelter to civic functioning and expressions 
of constitutional suspicion toward laws that burdened the poor were quickly set 
aside. 
Second, the social base of laissez-faire politics never went away in the 
United States; as David Grewal and I have argued, a historically unusual level 
of prosperity allowed shared wealth and social peace for a time between 
business and labor.81 However, an enduring substrate of opposition to the New 
Deal and the Great Society persisted both in demotic political culture and 
among economic elites.82 The Carthaginian peace that buried Lochner was 
 
 78.  See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional 
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012) (on the Tea Party’s influence on constitutional interpretation); 
Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011) 
(setting out in greater detail the role of Tea Party movement in developing arguments against the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act).  
 79.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE at MM34, Nov. 28, 
2010 (observing that arguments against the Affordable Care Act seemed “far-fetched only a year ago” 
but were likely to gain traction from Tea Party political influence). 
 80.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (financing public school 
districts through property taxes is not unconstitutional discrimination against students living in poor 
neighborhoods); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (a cap on welfare grants regardless of 
family size and need is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969) (statutory prohibition of welfare assistance to residents of less than a year is unconstitutional 
discrimination); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (a statute preventing school districts from 
admitting undocumented students violates the Equal Protection Clause).  
 81.  David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1. 
 82.  See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE 
PURDY_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/3/2014  12:55 PM 
No. 4 2014] NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 211 
rather more doctrinally specific, and more restricted to an elite professional 
culture, than several generations of law students, lawyers, and judges might 
have recognized.83 For both reasons, neoliberal constitutionalism could develop 
once the long crisis of the post–World War II settlement set in and certain 
economic interests began to align with freedom to advertise, spend, sell, and so 
forth. 
VI 
FREEDOM IN THE NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTION 
Lochner-era judges did not simply ride to the aid of factory owners against 
workers and labor-friendly legislatures. They were idealistic in their own way. 
Their open-market principles developed from the democratic and antislavery 
legacy of the earlier nineteenth century: Jacksonian attacks on monopolies and 
other forms of legally enshrined economic privilege, the Republican and 
Abolitionist war on slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal 
citizenship for all Americans.84 In effect, the Court, along with much of the 
country, sometimes reasoned as if the principle of equal freedom, the rejection 
of slavery, and economic special privilege amounted to an equal right to win or 
lose in the marketplace.85 So, with decades of struggle for equal freedom and 
civic dignity at its back, the Lochner-era Court struck down minimum wages, 
maximum hours, income taxes, rate regulation, and laws protecting labor 
unions. 
The early twenty-first century, too, follows an era of struggle for equal 
freedom that has fallen into uncertainty and conflict over the meaning of its 
emancipating achievement. In the modern instance, the backdrop is the Civil 
Rights era and expansion of individual liberty that earlier Supreme Courts did 
 
DEPRESSION 12–54 (2012) (discussion of reception of Hayek in United States upon the publication of 
his book, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM); RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER 
AND THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS (2001) 3–17, 43–60, 120–40 (on the social and 
ideological basis of the U.S. pro-market right in the twentieth century); Memorandum from Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 
1971), available at http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/ 
PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf. 
 83.  This is, of course, the argument usefully made in this issue by David Bernstein and Ilya Somin, 
who propose both that the jurisprudence of the Lochner era is less remote from what followed than is 
often imagined and that its distinctive features are now experiencing a revival in what they call 
libertarian constitutionalism. David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian 
Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 43. 
 84.  See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 87–109 (2010) (discussing origins, 
competing versions, and difficulties of free-labor thought). 
 85.  Justice Brewer gave especially vivid expression to this idea in an 1893 address to the New York 
State Bar Association. See David J. Brewer, The Nation’s Safeguard, 16 PROC. N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 37, 39 
(“It is the unvarying law, that the wealth of a community will be in the hands of a few . . . ”); id. at 46 
(“Who does not hear the old demagogic cry . . . ‘the majority are always right’ . . . invoked to justify 
disregard of those guaranties . . . [of] protection to private property?”); id. at 47 (warning against 
“anarchism,” “barbarism,” “socialism,” and the prospect that “the State [will] take all property and 
direct all the life and work of individuals as if they were little children”). 
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much to articulate and enforce. The same Justices who are driving the new 
antiregulatory decisions also have a view about the meaning of that twentieth-
century legacy, above all Brown v. Board of Education,86 the touchstone of the 
Civil Rights revolution. In cases challenging affirmative action in higher 
education and race-conscious school-placement plans in public schools, the 
Justices have argued that Brown establishes a color-blind Constitution, and that 
when the government classifies students for the purposes of different 
treatment—where to admit them to school, for instance—it strikes at the dignity 
of citizenship.87 
This view is idealistic, in its way. It insists on the autonomy of self-defining 
individuals, whose identities and relationships are their own to form, and may 
not be dictated, let alone marked as more or less worthy, by the hand of a 
supervisory state. But idealistic or not, in a world where racial stratification 
remains pervasive and tracks economic and educational inequality, this form of 
constitutional individualism can also be terribly unrealistic, even intellectually 
dishonest.88 As with differences in economic power, when the government 
closes its eyes to a real problem, it may only prevent itself from doing 
something about it. This position comes very close to “solving” the multifarious 
issue of race by leaving it up to millions of dispersed individuals to figure out. 
As Justice Kennedy wrote in Parents Involved, “Under our Constitution the 
individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, 
without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of 
her skin.”89 
If there is a neoliberal approach to race, this is it: respectful of a certain kind 
of individual choice, wary of government attempts to engineer the system, and 
mainly blind to the ways that inequality persists and makes race real in practice, 
even as the Supreme Court works to make it irrelevant in principle. Like the old 
Lochnerism, today’s new antiregulatory doctrines echo a sweeping view of the 
country’s situation and the meaning of its core ideals, a view that cuts across 
fields of social life and areas of constitutional doctrine. 
This point highlights a pair of parallels between the Lochner era and this 
neoliberal time, with import for understanding the role of conceptions of 
personal autonomy in normative views of political economy. First, any strong 
conception of negative autonomy—a right to refuse mandatory economic 
relations such as slavery or indenture in the first Lochner era, and a right to be 
 
 86.  349 U.S. 294 (1955).  
 87.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742–43, 746–48, 
797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is 
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society”); Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture: What Can 
Brown Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1049, 1063–66 (2009). 
 88.  See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN 
WHITE ADVANTAGE 108–20 (2014) (on how whites’ economic advantage has become “locked in[to]” 
the economy in such a way that it persists without any intentional racial discrimination).  
 89.  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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free of mandatory gender and racial identities and roles in the current era of 
constitutional individualism—has certain consequences that, unless one is a 
defender of the substance of those hierarchies, are undeniably emancipating. 
The attractiveness and importance of rights enforcing such conceptions of 
autonomy lie in the fact that they break people out of mandatory, hierarchical 
roles. 
The second point is that, with this emancipation achieved, the question 
becomes what are people emancipated into? What kind of political economy, 
what kinds of social relations, and what distribution of benefits and burdens 
follow emancipation? The danger of negative conceptions of autonomy is that it 
is tempting, and ideologically convenient for some positions, to pretend that 
they are not only necessary to achieve any worthwhile modern form of freedom, 
but sufficient to that goal. Then they become means to rationalize and insulate 
structurally produced inequality as being simply the product of fair relations 
among equally free individuals. That is the temptation and danger of neoliberal 
Lochnerism. 
What will become of all of this depends, at the simplest level, on the 
outcome of the next presidential election and the next few Supreme Court 
appointments. In a more complex way, it depends on the quality of politics and 
public life. The Constitution is what Americans make it. Constitutional law is 
unlikely to produce a better version of its core principles, freedom and equality, 
than America’s social movements and political leaders confidently voice and 
pursue. For a few decades in the twentieth century, regulating the economy to 
make personal freedom and security a reality was a goal shared between 
Democrats and Republicans, big business and labor. Earlier, however, it was a 
fraught idea, denounced as socialism or fascism, and it became consensual only 
after the crisis of the Depression and the decades-long efforts of the labor 
movement and progressive critics of laissez-faire. If Americans do not 
reestablish ideals of equality and personal liberty that take account of vast 
social and economic inequality and give government a strong role in addressing 
it, the United States will get the Constitution, and the country, it has earned. 
 
